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BOOK REVIEWS 
IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918. By Christopher N. 
May.1 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 
370. $29.95. 
Charles A. Lofgren 2 
Over the past several decades, politicians, academics, and (to a 
lesser extent) judges have debated the locus of the war powers. At-
tention to this boundary issue, deserved though it may be, has 
tended to obscure another constitutional dimension of warmaking: 
when Congress and the president cooperate, as they sometimes do, 
or when they simply refrain from challenging one another, the 
checks on governmental action are weak. It was almost forty years 
ago that Clinton Rossiter, after surveying the previous forty years, 
opined "that in time of war Congress can pass just about any law it 
wants as a 'necessary and proper' accessory to the delegated war 
powers; that the President can make just about any use of such law 
he sees fit; and that the people with their overt or silent resistance, 
not the Court with its power of judicial review, will set the only 
practical limits to arrogance and abuse. "3 
Sobering on its face, Rossiter's observation becomes even more 
troubling when one realizes that "war" is an inexact term, not 
neatly distinguishable from "peace." To the extent that war is diffi-
cult to define as a condition in the real world, the legitimate scope 
of the war powers within the Constitution becomes still more prob-
lematic, and not least because powerful arguments and authorities 
give the benefit of the doubt to latitudinarianism. As Alexander 
Hamilton put it, "unless it can be shewn, that the circumstances 
which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain de-
I. James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los 
Angeles. 
2. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna 
College, and member of the Graduate Faculty in History of the Claremont Colleges. 
3. C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 100 (1951; 
expanded edition with additional text by R. Longaker, 1976). 
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terminate limits ... , it must be admitted, as a necessary conse-
quence, that there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to 
provide for the defence and protection of the community, in any 
matter essential to its efficacy .... "4 
Professor Christopher N. May's book examines how Hamil-
ton's "necessary consequence" provided an attractive pretext for ac-
complishing "progressive" goals in the aftermath of World War I, 
and how the Supreme Court dealt with such disingenuous uses of 
the war powers. The focus is on four areas of federal activity in the 
months and years following Armistice Day, all set against the back-
drop of earlier reform efforts, and all raising questions about the 
extent of the domestic war powers. To give away the conclusion, 
Rossiter was not quite correct-not quite everything passed consti-
tutional muster following World War I. Hamilton's "necessary 
consequence" proved less than absolutely necessary. 
I 
One role for the war powers was to undergird two "experi-
ments in socialism," as May labels them. In December 1917, the 
Wilson Administration seized the railroads, an action ratified by 
Congress in legislation authorizing federal operation for up to 
twenty-one months after formal reestablishment of peace. 
Although his treatment of the rail seizure is brief, May finds that 
contemporaries suspected that the seizure would prove permanent. 
He gives greater attention to the other experiment, control of com-
munications. President Wilson obtained congressional authoriza-
tion to take over wire communication companies after alleging that 
a prospective telegraphers' strike threatened prosecution of the war. 
in fact, the telegraphers had orchestrated the strike threat in hope 
of just such an outcome, expecting favorable treatment from federal 
officials. Leading company officials also welcomed the seizure, pre-
dicting that under government control labor problems would be 
mitigated, rates regularized, and ownership restructured. 
Formal seizure of domestic telegraph and telephone services 
occurred on August 1, 1918, but implementation came mainly after 
the Armistice.s While a few critics disputed the war powers ration-
ale, support for the takeover itself was initially widespread. As gov-
ernment operation proceeded under the direction of Postmaster 
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147-48 (J. Cooke, ed. 1961). 
5. In addition, an order dated November 2, 1918, but not announced until November 
16, was issued for seizure of international cables. Wilson subsequently justified it as necessary 
to insure the free flow of news in preparation for the peace conference, but complications 
resulting from foreign participation in operation of the cables prevented its implementation. 
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General AlbertS. Burleson, the two industry giants, Western Union 
and AT&T, apparently remained satisfied; but Clarence Mackay, 
owner of two smaller companies, complained of mistreatment, labor 
found its expectations dashed, and users encountered mismanage-
ment and higher rates. Few beyond the large companies mourned 
the end of the experiment in July 1919. 
Thanks to the eighteenth amendment, national prohibition en-
joyed a longer life. The amendment did not take effect, however, 
until January 16, 1920. Meanwhile, the wartime Lever Food and 
Fuel Control Act had outlawed production of hard liquor and had 
given Wilson sufficient discretionary authority to enable him to re-
strict brewers to making 2. 75 percent beer. The Anti-Saloon 
League then successfully lobbied for passage of the War-Time Pro-
hibition Act, which was signed into law ten days after the Armistice 
and took effect only on July 1, 1919, to continue "until the termina-
tion of mobilization." As one congressman conceded, the law 
would have been "unconstitutional if passed ... in times of peace. 
The only authority that Congress has now for passing this [law] is 
the war power." But its effective date belied the war power ration-
ale, while other legislation adequately guaranteed conservation and 
sober soldiers and defense workers. 
Indeed, before the War-Time Prohibition Act took effect, Wil-
son had overcome his earlier worry that a total ban on beer might 
"introduce a new element of disturbance in the labor situation 
which I should dread" and used his authority under the Lever Act 
to prohibit brewing, effective December 1, 1918. Despite a "No 
Beer, No Work" campaign, the relaxation of controls in early 1919 
extended only to "non-intoxicating" beverages, which the Food Ad-
ministration and Bureau of Internal Revenue interpreted as al-
lowing nothing stronger than 0.5 percent beer. While this 
interpretation ignored considerable testimony, as well as lower 
court decisions, that 2. 75 percent "war beer" met the non-intoxicat-
ing standard, it received legislative endorsement in the Volstead 
Act's Title J.6 
A third concern after the Armistice was price and rent regula-
tion. Wartime price controls under the Lever Act had been indi-
rect, at least by later standards, and were aimed especially at 
guaranteeing high production and protecting the government as a 
purchaser. By the end of March 1919, these controls had been 
ended. Then, however, prices began a sharp ascent, labor called for 
new controls, and Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, who har-
6. We commonly associate the Volstead Act with implementation of the eighteenth 
amendment, but its Title I related to the War-Time Prohibition Act. 
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bored presidential ambitions, took up the issue. Prosecutions fol-
lowed, targeted especially at local merchants, for, as May reads 
Palmer's motives, attacks on local price gougers rather than on 
large suppliers seemed likely to draw support from the newly en-
franchised women voters. In October 1919, Congress remedied one 
ensuing difficulty when it added criminal sanctions to a key section 
of the Lever Act. Revealingly, Palmer appeared unworried about 
the tardiness of the correction, claiming that "the mere fact of ad-
ding the penalty after the law was passed doesn't mean that viola-
tors of the law from the time it became effective cannot be 
punished." 
After sifting through the official statistics on price-fixing and 
related cases, May estimates "that there were at least 1,100 prosecu-
tions, and perhaps as many as 1 ,300, instituted under the Lever Act 
starting almost a year after the armistice." Overall, more than 
ninety percent of all the criminal prosecutions under the law, which 
of course rested on the war powers, arose from offenses following 
the end of hostilities. Leaders and members of the United Mine 
Workers also felt the Lever Act's force when Palmer broke the 1919 
coal strike with an injunction and criminal proceedings for conspir-
acy. The basis for still further litigation was laid when the 1919 
amendments to the Lever Act became a vehicle for passing rent 
control for the District of Columbia, a step (as the law explained in 
part) "made necessary by emergencies growing out of the war .... " 
Certainly the best known part of May's narrative is his remain-
ing topic, the postwar attack on radicalism under the Espionage and 
Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918. On this front, available statistics 
do not lend themselves to separating prosecutions for post-Armi-
stice activities from those for wartime episodes. What stands out, 
however, is that perceived internal threats to the domestic political 
and social order, not challenges to national security, animated the 
government's actions. (Ironically, this was not inconsistent with 
the motivations behind the 1918 law.) Criminal indictments were 
used especially against Wobblies in the West and their sympathiz-
ers, while the postal censorship provisions fell hard on socialist 
publications. 
Numbers aside, two bits of evidence provide a sense of the 
targets of the efforts at repression. One is a poem on the Versailles 
settlement that helped trigger criminal prosecution of the Seattle 
Union Record: 
And I thought: "Let us face 
At last the naked fact. 
THEY were like beasts 
And WE were like beasts. 
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We won, thank God, not they! 
And we take 
What we CHOOSE, 
Even as they would have done 
By law of club and fang. 
But there is NO HONOR 
LEFT 
And no high sounding aims 
For ANY of us!" 
113 
As May relates the subsequent indictment, this poem was alleged to 
contain " 'disloyal, scurrilous, and abusive language' which tended 
to bring the government, the Constitution, and the military 'into 
contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute.' " The other item is 
Postmaster General Burleson's official explanation of post-
Armistice postal censorship: "The character of the disloyal and 
seditious matter found in the mails since the signing of the armistice 
has differed materially from that which the department dealt with 
during ... the war. It is now of a radical, revolutionary type, 
having for its object the solidification of the revolutionary elements 
in this country and the overturning of our present form of 
government by force." At least in the criminal prosecutions, juries 
sometimes proved a hurdle for the government, as did judges when 
they scrutinized indictments. 
II 
May places these efforts at government control within the con-
text of what we used to call the progressive "movement." This con-
text, as he develops it, is problematic. True, some progressives 
espoused more federal direction and even ownership. Nor is it a 
mistake to see some as buoyant about the possibilities for using the 
war to push a reform agenda still further. As David Kennedy has 
summarized, "At the time of the Armistice, progressives hoped to 
preserve and even to extend many of the collectivist practices and 
much of the state authority that had grown up during the war. "7 
The problem is that when May explicitly offers interpretations 
of progressivism (particularly in his first chapter, but also here and 
there in his recounting of the post-Armistice episodes), he tends to-
ward depicting it primarily as a movement of high-minded reform, 
with the people battling the interests. It is only a slight exaggera-
tion to say that a reader whose last encounter with progressivism 
was, say, Eric Goldman's Rendezvous with Destiny (1952) would 
7. D. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 
246 (1980). 
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feel fully at home with May's first chapter.s The result, in May's 
account, is a jarring clash between progressive aspirations and the 
tawdry postwar record. 
By contrast, historians have increasingly emphasized that one 
dimension of early-twentieth century reform was a thrust for elite-
imposed social efficiency and social control; it was not all a drive 
against monopolies and for social justice. 9 Had May taken account 
of this characteristic of the prewar era, he might have discussed 
more systematically similar motivations behind the post-Armistice 
willingness to use war-powers justifications. Certainly much of the 
evidence he so adroitly mines from contemporary sources suggests a 
use of law in the service of liberal (and not-so-liberal) corporatism 
within a rationalized social order. 
III 
Besides exploring the legislative and enforcement history of the 
post-Armistice actions taken in the name of war, May considers 
their broader constitutional dimensions. To begin with, he places 
the post-Armistice events in the context of a prewar assault on judi-
cial review. State and federal judges had struck down hundreds of 
regulatory laws, which had a twofold effect. For one thing, result-
ing attacks on judicial review prompted increasingly cavalier atti-
tudes toward constitutional limitations in general, a tendency 
abetted by the fascination with pragmatism in intellectual circles. 
For another, judicial constraints resting especially on doctrines of 
due process and federalism were a reality, and this made pretextual 
uses of the war powers highly attractive. Existing case law indi-
cated that legal moves against war-related actions might take three 
forms: allegations that the actions were too remote in time from the 
period of war (that is, durational challenges); arguments charging 
the lack of a reasonable relation between the challenged actions and 
the war emergency; and claims that actions infringed guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights. Within these categories, to be sure, courts had 
sometimes overturned actions based solely on executive authority, 
but legislation resting on the war powers had generally been upheld. 
Supporters of continued government controls in the post-Ar-
mistice period were well aware of this record. Defending amend-
ments to strengthen the War-Time Prohibition Act, for example, 
8. See E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY: A HISTORY OF MODERN 
AMERICAN REFORM, esp. chs. 7-10 (1952; rev. ed. 1958). 
9. See Rodgers, In Search of Progessivism, in THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN HISTORY: 
PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 113, 122-23 (S. Kutler & S. Katz eds. 1982). (Also published as 
vol. 10, no. 4, of REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Dec. 1982].) 
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Congressman Andrew Volstead stated in February 1919: "If Con-
gress finds that it ... must maintain in the exercise of its war pow-
ers a situation which makes it necessary to enact this legislation, our 
courts can not review that finding . . . . Congress and the Executive 
must determine what means are necessary for carrying on war. 
Courts can not be permitted to interfere." At the same time, with 
no eye on consistency, the legislators largely eschewed any in-
dependent obligation to consider constitutional issues. As House 
Speaker Champ Clark put it while defending the Sedition Act, 
"That is for the courts." Executive branch officials added their en-
dorsements to the Catch-22 reasoning. 
Initially, the Supreme Court responded in the expected fash-
ion. In cases from North and South Dakota, the experiments in 
control of the rails and wire communications came under attack. In 
its challenge to the post-Armistice wire controls, South Dakota in 
particular used what May evaluates as "a sophisticated durational 
attack, drawing a distinction between Congress's action during the 
war and the executive's subsequent enforcement efforts." But the 
Court held that the war power was plenary, and "a mere excess or 
abuse of discretion ... involve[ d) considerations which are beyond 
the reach of judicial power."IO It seems likely, as May suggests, 
that the Court was also swayed by the announced termination of 
both experiments, as well as by the states-rights focus of each state's 
argument. No specific individual or corporate rights were claimed 
to have been infringed. 
Nor did challenges to convictions under the Espionage and Se-
dition Acts result in any check on federal authority. Because the 
eight cases decided by the Supreme Court between March 1919 and 
March 1920 all involved pre-Armistice offenses, they did not pose 
durational issues. Even so, the decisions revealed a dim view of Bill 
of Rights arguments: the clear-and-present danger test emerged as 
a justification for suppression, not a limitation on government 
power. 
The Court also upheld the War-Time Prohibition Act, but with 
a difference. Writing for a unanimous Court in Hamilton v. Ken-
tucky Distilleries, Justice Brandeis conceded in passing that "(t]he 
war power of the United States, like its other powers and like the 
police power of the States, is subject to applicable constitutional 
limitations." I I Because the law gave distillers adequate time to 
dispose of their stocks, however, it was not an unconstitutional 
"taking." 
10. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 183·84 (1919). 
II. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919). 
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Behind Brandeis's wording lay circumstances and maneuver-
ings that May skillfully describes. The vote in conference had origi-
nally been five-to-four against the constitutionality of the act. 
Brandeis succeeded in pulling Holmes to his side by arguments on 
the merits of the taking issue, but events outside the Court, as well 
as pressure from Chief Justice White to win over the other four 
justices, led to the concession just quoted in place of wording in an 
initial draft that stressed the Court's impotence in the war powers 
area. As May relates, "Hamilton was argued in the Supreme Court 
on November 20 [1919] and decided on December 15. During this 
four-week period the daily press brimmed with tales of the govern-
ment's ongoing enforcement of war powers legislation in a range of 
settings." Then, too, the direction of the Espionage and Sedition 
Act cases may have further persuaded Brandeis of the wisdom of 
recognizing some degree of limitation. In any event, doubts within 
the High Court became still more apparent three weeks later in 
Ruppert v. Cajfey.12 There the War-Time Prohibition Act's ban on 
"war beer" survived a challenge against its reasonable relationship 
to a prohibition scheme, but only by a bare five-to-four majority. 
Although their implications went largely unnoticed by contem-
poraries, May explains that "Hamilton and Ruppert marked the end 
of an era." It was now likely that durational, reasonable-relation-
ship, and especially Bill of Rights challenges stressing property 
rights would at least receive a hearing. Not least, the dangers of 
allowing wide latitude to the war powers were becoming more ap-
parent. Defeat of the Versailles Treaty in the Senate was followed 
by disagreements between President Wilson and Republicans in 
Congress over ending the state of war through ordinary statute. 
Meanwhile, continued application of the Lever Act resulted in cases 
testing its constitutionality. 
In ten Lever Act cases, lower courts overturned sections of the 
law on fifth and sixth amendment grounds. The price control provi-
sion of Section 4 fell, and in a couple of cases judges struck down 
the entire section, thereby undercutting use of its anti-conspiracy 
provision against strikers. No matter that in perhaps twice as many 
cases courts upheld the Act; enforcement became difficult. The 
government asked for Supreme Court review of the adverse lower 
court decisions on an expedited basis, and the Court heard argu-
ments in October 1920. Its decision in United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Company 13 came down on February 28, 1921. 
Rejecting government arguments that Congress was the sole 
12. 251 u.s. 264 (1920). 
13. 255 u.s. 81 (1921). 
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judge of the necessity of exerting its war powers during the period 
of the Armistice, Chief Justice White wrote for himself and five col-
leagues that "the mere existence of a state of war could not suspend 
or change the operation upon the power of Congress of the guaran-
ties and limitations of the fifth and sixth Amendments .... " The 
Lever Act's fourth section, which prohibited "any unjust or unrea-
sonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any neces-
saries," was void for vagueness.l4 While legislation to repeal the 
entire act passed three days later, the Court's decision had a real 
effect, for it "was fatal to scores of profiteering actions then pending 
in federal courts around the country." Even more, the "decision 
stands as a landmark in American constitutional history .... This 
was only the second time in the Court's 130-year history that a 
piece of war powers legislation had been held unconstitutional"-
and in the first instance, involving the legal tender issue after the 
Civil War, the Court had quickly reversed itself. 
Congress was slow to learn, however. Rent control in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, originally enacted in 1919 when the Lever Act 
was amended, was extended three times-in August 1921, May 
1922, and May 1924--with the last extension (signed by Calvin 
Coolidge) carrying control to May 1925. A Coolidge-supported ef-
fort at further extension then failed only in the face of strong lobby-
ing by real estate interests. In the course of this sequence, two cases 
rose to the Supreme Court. Although the Court did not formally 
invalidate the rent control scheme on either occasion, it tied its rul-
ings closely to the facts of the cases and clearly revealed its conclu-
sion that the judiciary should exercise independent judgment on 
whether conditions justifying the legislation continued to exist. In 
the second decision, in April 1924, the Court remanded the case for 
trial on the issue of whether a housing emergency had been present 
at the time of the May 1922 extension. Moreover, Justice Holmes 
in his opinion for the Court stated that "a court is not at liberty to 
shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law 
depends upon the truth of what is declared," and included the dic-
tum that "if the question were only whether the statute is in force 
to-day, upon the facts we judicially know, we should be compelled 
to say that the law has ceased to operate."1s Finally, in November 
1924, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals took its cue from 
14. /d. at 88-89. Justices Pitney and Brandeis found the section constitutional, but con-
curred in the Court's judgment on statutory grounds, and Justice Day did not participate in 
the case. See id. at 93-97. Regarding Brandeis's position, May observes: "In 1917 Brandeis 
had advised Herbert Hoover on how to secure passage of the Lever Act; this may partly 
explain his reluctance to find the act unconstitutional." 
15. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-49 (1924) (ruling on a requested 
118 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:109 
Holmes's dictum and held the latest rent control extension uncon-
stitutional, a decision that the Supreme Court declined to review.'6 
IV 
In short, Professor May has recounted a fascinating story. His 
study rests on thorough research into a wealth of contemporary 
sources, both printed and archival, and into the secondary litera-
ture. His 275 pages of text are followed by eighty pages of notes 
that are not padded with the sentence-by-sentence and even clause-
by-clause citations that too often dot legal writing. The account 
deserves the attention not only of students of constitutional history, 
but of those interested in early twentieth century reform, the Wilson 
Administration, and policy history in general. My earlier com-
plaint about May's overt interpretations of progressivism reflects 
practically the only weakness I detect in the book-save the subtitle 
and the final chapter. 
To describe the book as a study of "Judicial Review and the 
War Powers since 1918" is to misstate its focus. Some who should 
be attracted will be put off, and others who really are looking for a 
substantial treatment of the whole picture since World War I will 
be disappointed. The period since 1925 draws some attention in 
May's final chapter, but only after he has already described the epi-
sode over rent control in the District of Columbia as "a fitting one 
with which to conclude .... " In reality, May makes no pretense of 
giving developments since the mid-1920s the close examination in 
their own right that the earlier events receive, nor does he review 
them with an eye toward a detailed unraveling of the fate of the 
Hamilton doctrine as endorsed in Cohen. Instead, after noting how 
the need to use the war powers as a pretext for domestic legislation 
has disappeared in the face of expansive readings of the commerce 
power, he briefly surveys the cases developing out of World War II, 
the Cold War, and Vietnam. From these, he concludes "that, al-
most without exception, federal judges have been unwilling to inter-
cede during periods of national emergency. While the principle 
articulated in Hamilton has technically endured, it is in constant 
danger of succumbing to judicial abdication." 
injunction against enforcement of the D.C. rent control law). May again nicely lays out the 
behind-the-scenes maneuvering that produced the final wording. 
16. In his opinion for the District of Columbia's Court of Appeals (not yet the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the District), Justice Robb expressed some of the exasperation over 
Congress's persistence: "[W]e may say with propriety that, if the emergency in question is 
not at an end, then this legislation may be extended indefinitely, and that which was 'intended 
to meet a temporary emergency' may become permanent law." Peck v. Fink, 2 F.2d 912, 913 
(D.C. Ct. App. 1924), cert. denied sub nom. Fink v. Peck, 266 U.S. 631 (1925). 
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Yet, despite its add-on quality, his final chapter offers sensible 
generalizations. The Court, he argues, tends toward one of two 
courses in national security cases. Either it offers ritualistic ap-
proval of the challenged actions, or it invokes variants on the polit-
ical question doctrine to avoid the issues. Notwithstanding efforts 
to link decisions to unique situations, the former course embeds per-
nicious doctrines in the Constitution, which makes the latter course 
preferable although hardly unproblematic. Better still is an ap-
proach that defers decisions. May especially recommends that 
judges utilize the requirement of ripeness, but also allow litigants to 
return later without meeting roadblocks on mootness grounds. 
May's discussion of these points is at a high enough level of general-
ity to make detailed responses difficult-and a little unfair. Suffice 
it to say that as history the final chapter's tie to the post-Armistice 
interlude is slight. 
TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROM· 
ISED LAND. By Robert A. Burt.1 Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1988. Pp. 165. $19.95. 
Melvin 1 Urojsky2 
Professor Robert Burt's interpretive essay on Louis Brandeis 
and Felix Frankfurter is at once provocative and frustrating. Pro-
fessor Burt often throws out a brilliant insight that helps us to un-
derstand these two men, yet he does not and cannot provide the 
type of evidence that would confirm his basic thesis-that their Jew-
ishness shaped their judicial outlook. Being Jewish, even as margin-
ally Jewish as these two, must have affected their lives in some 
ways. Yet Burt's elucidation of how and why their Jewishness led 
to their jurisprudence is far from convincing. 
Burt first became attracted to this topic when, as he relates, he 
noticed the very high percentage of fellow Jews teaching in law 
schools such as Yale and Harvard. This led him to wonder why 
Jews entered the profession, and this in turn led him to the careers 
of Brandeis and Frankfurter, "two Jews who attained great promi-
nence at a time when the American legal profession generally was 
inhospitable to Jews." He began his research, and concluded that 
"Jewishness was distinctively associated with outsider status, with 
homelessness, for both Brandeis and Frankfurter." Their different 
I. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University. 
